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PROVIDENCE, FOREKNOWLEDGE, 
AND DECISION PROCEDURES 
Tomis Kapitan 
In "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge" (Faith and Philosophy 
this issue) David Paul Hunt defends the possibility of a providential use of 
foreknowledge against what he calls the "Doxastic Problem." This problem 
stems from an alleged incompatibility between decision and prescience, and 
Hunt attempts to disarm a version of it that I presented in 1984. However, 
Hunt's criticisms fail to address the argument that if deciding presupposes 
belief in an open future, and the latter requires a sense of contingency with 
respect to what one takes oneself to believe, then an omniprescient being can 
never decide to do anything. 
In "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge" (Faith and Philosophy 
this issue) David Paul Hunt attempts to remove some challenges to the pos-
sibility of a providential use of foreknowledge. One of these, the so-called 
"Doxastic Problem," owes its origin to an apparent conflict between decision 
and prescience, that is, between the claim that an agent might antecedently 
know what it will choose and the principle, 
(DP) It is impossible to hold the belief that p while deciding to bring it about 
that p. 
Thus, if God is omniscient or, at least omniprescient, then, by (DP), God 
cannot decide to bring about anything and, hence, never makes providential 
use of His foreknowledge. I 
Hunt correctly notes that (DP) is plausible only with respect to accessed 
beliefs, presumably, to beliefs either consciously held or to which the subject 
has immediate conscious access. If divine knowledge of the future is unac-
cessed, there is no Doxastic Problem for divine providence. But Hunt remains 
uncomfortable with (DP), and questions its defense by means of the further 
principle that deciding presupposes believing that the future is open, more 
exactly, 
(DO) If at h S decides to do action A, then at some time 12 appropriately 
prior to tl, S believes that it is yet open for himlher to A.2 
While not contesting this principle, Hunt argues that a belief about what one 
will do does not imply a belief about what one must do, and hence, antecedent 
doxastic commitment does not preclude belief in an open future. 
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To illustrate, Hunt supposes that a young lady, Sally, faces a choice between 
marrying Lester or marrying Chester. Informed by a fortune-teller that she 
will marry Chester, Sally's natural credulity inclines her to believe what she 
is told. However, she "has no grounds for supposing that she must marry 
Chester, or that she can 'f pursue another course of action," [po 410] and to 
that extent, she retains a sense of openness with respect to marrying Chester. 
Torn between Lester and Chester, she might even try to make her decision 
through a coin toss; heads it's Lester, tails it's Chester. Writes Hunt, 
She flips the coin, believing that it will come up tails (as entailed by her 
choice of decision-procedure together with her credence in the fortune-
teller's prediction). Note that, if the coin were to come up heads, she would 
decide in favor of Lester. Thus, the decision procedure is not merely "idling." 
[pp. 410-11] 
The upshot is that Sally might face an open future and utilize a decision 
procedure while retaining her belief about what her eventual choice will be. 
Hence, (OP) is false. 
This solution to the Ooxastic Problem is unconvincing, though Hunt is 
correct to object to (OP). This principle is false as it stands since an agent S 
might believe that p will be true no matter what, yet still deliberate whether 
he himself will be the agent who brings about p rather than someone else 
whom he believes would bring about p if he didn't. A more plausible principle 
is this: 
(DP*) It is impossible for a rational, self-reflective agent to consciously 
entertain the belief that he/she will perform an action A while, at 
the same time, deliberating about whether to perform A. 
The case for this weaker principle rests upon (DO) and the following reflec-
tions about what it is to believe a course of action to be open. 
To have a sense of openness about a course of action A one must presume 
that one both can perform A and can refrain from A-ing, thus, (i) that one 
would A or not depending on how one decides, and (ii) that one's decision 
about A-ing, whatever it might be, is yet contingent. This modality is not a 
mere logical or nomological contingency; there are too many things one 
recognizes to be logically or nomologically possible which are nevertheless 
ruled out by prevailing circumstances. Instead, an agent takes a course of 
action to be open only by assuming that both it and its complement are 
possible given circumstances as they now stand, in which case the contin-
gency is a concrete or relative modality.3 
I have argued elsewhere that the qualifier 'circumstances as they now stand' 
occurs inside attitudinal scope and captures minimally, what a suitably ra-
tional and self-reflective agent takes himself to believe. In this context, an 
agent is suitably rational only if its accessed beliefs are both consistent and 
closed with respect to acknowledged consequence, and suitably self-reflec-
FOREKNOWLEDGE AND DECISION PROCEDURES 417 
tive if it is cognizant of what these accessed beliefs are. By definition, an 
omniscient being is suitably rational and self-reflective.4 Taking the relativi-
zation on contingency to occur internally squares nicely with the response of 
the cautious deliberator who, when asked if he is able to take any of the 
considered alternatives, reports; 'Yes I can, as far as I can tell.' Indexing 
'open' in this way, a suitably rational and self-reflective agent who already 
believes that he will do A takes the future to be "fixed" or "settled" with 
respect to his A-ing, not "open." Obviously, he cannot then take his A-ing to 
be contingent relative to what he himself then believes. 
This strategy treats 'believes' as expressing firm commitment, not merely 
a supposition that a proposition is likely. Of course, our future-directed dox-
astic states are typically probabilistic, less than firm, because we are well 
aware of our incomplete grasp of the course of events. Moreover, we com-
monly use 'believes' to express such less-than-firm commitments. But for an 
omniscient being, the ascriptive use of 'believes' to indicate the more restric-
tive firm commitment is unquestionably appropriate; probability is not its 
guide to life, however prevalent it is for us. Here, then, is the rationale for 
(DP*). 
Returning to Sally's case, if she is suitable self-reflective while consciously 
believing that she will marry Chester, then relative to what she takes herself 
to believe, marrying Chester is part of the fixed future and she no longer 
presumes it is open for her to do otherwise. Were she to think it is still open 
what she will do, she would allow that it is yet possible, given all that she 
takes herself to believe, that she marry Lester instead, but then she wouldn't 
have an accessed belief that she will marry Chester. Believing that she will 
marry Chester, by contrast, Sally could not be using the coin toss in order to 
decide whether to marry him; that matter is settled, even though her perceiv-
ing the coin to come up heads might cause her to change her mind and marry 
Lester instead. If she did utilize the coin toss as a decision procedure then, 
by the reasoning used to motivate (DP*), it would be a simple misnomer to 
describe Sally as "deliberating" about whom to marry while consciously 
"believing" that she will marry Chester. 
In "Can God Make Up His Mind?," however, my argument against the 
possibility of an omniscient decider is not based upon (DP*), rather, upon 
(DO). Consider; as an omniscient being, God is both rational and self-reflec-
tive. Assuming that for each action-type A and times t1 and t2, it is either true 
at tJ that God will A at t2 or it is true at t1 that God will refrain from A-ing 
at t2, then God never possesses the required sense of openness regarding his 
A-ing. If, by contrast, God were to decide whether or not to A then, by (DO), 
he would antecedently assume that his A-ing is open, and if so, there would 
be a time during which God realized that his A-ing is contingent relative to 
what he then believes. But since God believes all and only truths, and given 
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that (i) either it is true that he will A or that he will refrain from A-ing, and 
(ii) God is suitably rational and self-reflective, then God either believes that 
he will A or believes that he will refrain from A-ing. Hence, God could never 
believe that his A-ing is contingent with respect to what he believes. There-
fore, God can neither deliberate nor choose, nor-as I have subsequently 
argued-act intentionally.s 
Hunt does not confront this reasoning squarely. Instead, he criticizes the 
reasoning I employed in responding to Quinn's attempt to show how decision 
and foreknowledge could be combined.6 My position, Hunt contends, implies 
that all our decisions are either criterion less or decisions about which decision 
procedures to use; e.g., to take an umbrella if it looks like rain, etc. Thus, he 
writes, 
If Kapitan's analysis is correct I do not decide anything as I pass the umbrella 
rack on my way to the door-I merely implement a decision that I made a 
long time ago when I chose a certain criterion, a criterion which now happens 
to be satisfied. [po 411] 
Hunt finds it implausible that one who accepts the conditional decision-pro-
cedure does not make any further decision on the way out the door, viz., to 
take the umbrella: 
That means that the only genuine decisions-or at least the only decisions 
the Doxastic Principle should be construed as governing-are criterionless. 
This is itself a reductio of Kapitan's argument; alternatively, it is proof that 
the Doxastic Principle is not a principle governing all decisions, but only a 
special class of decisions. [po 411] 
Since there is no reason to suppose that God makes only the criterion less 
decisions covered by (DP), Hunt concludes that God's providential govern-
ance is not jeopardized by His complete foreknowledge. 
These conclusions are unwarranted. To adopt a decision procedure is one 
decision; to utilize that procedure in helping one to make upon one's mind 
about which course of action to pursue is a process which terminates in a 
distinct decision. When I decided to adopt the umbrella criterion, for example, 
I endorsed the conditional: to take the umbrella if it is raining or about to 
rain. Merely endorsing this intention is never sufficient for my taking an 
umbrella on any given occasion, nor for the distinct intending to take the 
umbrella. I must first determine whether it is raining or about to (say, by 
looking outside or reading the weather report). When I come to believe that 
it is raining now or about to, I thereby acquire the distinct intention to take 
the umbrella, though the effect of my having previously adopted the condi-
tional intention makes this acquisition relatively automatic, eliminating the 
necessity for deliberation. But a distinct intending it is nevertheless, and 
before I acquired it I did not know that I would take the umbrella; at best I 
knew that I would take the umbrella if it is raining or about to. Therefore, 
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Hunt is wrong to describe the situation as he does and to hold that my position 
is committed to claiming that all decisions are criterionless or choices of 
which decision-procedures to follow. 
If I am correct, Hunt's closing attempt to salvage the providential use of 
foreknowledge comes to naught. In his brief description of the interplay 
between criteria and decisions in divine decision-making, he speaks as though 
God undergoes a temporal process of coming to know and coming to intend: 
He can draw on His knowledge of the actual world to determine which of 
these conditionals have true antecedents. Only then does He decide what 
response to make, and this response always follows the criteria He has 
adopted (since there could be no occasion for God to change His mind about 
these). [po 412] 
This very description presents a picture of God as "making up His mind" in 
the course of time, and were such a description accurate then we could only 
conclude that at some earlier stages God's mind was not yet made up. Delib-
eration, decision, coming to intend, can only be processes which endeavor to 
settle what is previously unsettled. If God undergoes such processes, then by 
(DO), there is some antecedent time during which God has a sense of open-
ness with respect to the courses of action under consideration. If so, God 
presumed that his performing any of these alternatives were as yet contingent 
with respect to what he took himself to believe. But he could not then have 
believed of any of the alternatives that he would perform it and, hence, he 
could not have known what his future decision would be. 
I conclude that Hunt's attempt to remove the threat to the providential use 
of foreknowledge posed by the Doxastic Problem fails. Accepting either 
(DP*) or (DO), we must acknowledge that the merger of choice with omnis-
cience remains precarious. 
Northern Illinois University 
NOTES 
1. This sort of argument is developed in Richard La Croix, "Omniprescience and Divine 
Determinism," Religious Studies 12 (1976), pp. 365-81. The argument is disputed in Philip 
Quinn, "Divine Foreknowledge and Divine Freedom, International Journalfor Philoso-
phy of Religion 9 (1978), pp. 219-40, but in "Can God Make Up His Mind?" International 
Journalfor Philosophy of Religion 15 (1984), pp. 37-47, I defend La Croix's conclusion 
by means of a different argument. Hunt addresses the latter in section IV of his paper. 
2. Principle (DO) does not appear, as such, in my "Can God Make Up His Mind?," 
though it is a consequence of the argumentation presented in pp. 40-44 of that essay. 
3. A proposition P is contingent relative to a set S just in case neither P nor not-P is a 
consequence of S. In relation to the issue of free will, relative modality has been discussed 
by several, including A. E. Falk, "Some Modal Confusions in Compatibilism," American 
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Philosophical Quarterly 18 (1981), pp. 141-48; M. Siote, "Selective Necessity and Free 
Will," Journal of Philosophy 77 (1982), pp. 136-51; and T. Kapitan, "Doxastic Freedom: 
A Compatibilist Alternative," American Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1989), pp. 31-42. 
4. I argue for this implication in "Agency and Omniscience," Religious Studies 27 
(1991), pp. 105-20. See also my "Deliberation and the Presumption of Open Alternatives," 
The Philosophical Quarterly 36 (1986), pp. 230-51. 
5. Concerning the first disjunct, see "Can God Make Up His Mind?" The second is 
defended in "Agency and Omniscience" and, again, in "Action, Uncertainty, and Divine 
Impotence," Analysis 50 (1990), pp. 127-33. In "Doxastic Freedom: A Compatibilist 
Alternative" it is argued that in the presumption of contingency, the quantification over 
one's beliefs must be over the totality of what one takes oneself to believe, not just over 
those that are accessed, even if one's presumption is mistaken. If so, one cannot locate 
the contingency needed for divine action in what is or is not included in God's accessed 
beliefs. 
6. See Quinn, op. cit., and my response to Quinn in "Can God Make Up His Mind?" 
especially, pp. 38-39. 
